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et al.: Civil Rights

CIVIL RIGHTS
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11:
No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be
subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other

person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state
or any agency or subdivision of the state.

CRIMINAL TERM
KINGS COUNTY
5
People v. Dieppall
(decided June 25, 1993)

Defendant sought to set aside his conviction for
discrimination in criminal violation of Civil
section 40-c(2), 116 originally adopted as article I,
the New York State Constitution. 117 In this

two counts of
Rights Law
section 11 of
case of first

impression, the court, in denying defendant's motion to set aside

the verdict1 18 held that the defendant's acts of striking and
115. 158 Misc. 2d 584, 601 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993).
116. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 40-c(2) (McKinney 1992). Section 40-c(2)
provides that:
No person shall, because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex,
marital status or disability, as such term is defined in section two
hundred ninety-two of the executive law, be subjected to any
discrimination in his civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in
section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other
person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any
agency or subdivision of the state.
Id.
117. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article I, § 11 provides in relevant part:
No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected
to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or
subdivision of the state.
Id.
118. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 585, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 787. At the conclusion
of all of the evidence, defendant moved, pursuant to New York Criminal
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stabbing complainant, a store employee, as well as calling him a
"filthy Jew," interfered with the exercise of the complainant's
civil rights, and were criminal within Civil Rights Law section
40-c(2). 119
The evidence at defendant's trial established that over a period

of several months, defendant, a customer at the complainant's
store, had engaged in verbal harassment of the complainant by
yelling obscenities and religious epithets at him. 120 On January
10, 1992, the defendant entered the store, "struck [the
and stabbed him in
complainant] in the head with a bottle,
121
object."
sharp
a
with
the back
On February 6, 1992, just a little while after being released
from the hospital, although still unable to work, the complainant
visited the store. 122 During his visit, defendant appeared outside
and threw a garbage can through the window.123 Again,
defendant shouted religious epithets and obscenities at the
Procedure Law § 290.10, to have his case dismissed. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at
585, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 787; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 290.10 (McKinney
1993). § 290.10 provides in relevant part:
At the conclusion of the people's case or at the conclusion of all the
evidence, the tourt may ...(a) issue a "trial order of dismissal,"
dismissing any count of an indictment upon the ground that the trial
evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein
or any lesser included offense, or (b) reserve decision on the motion
until after the verdict has been rendered and accepted by the court.
Id. The court reserved decision, and the case was submitted to the jury. After
the verdict, defendant renewed his application pursuant to § 330.30 of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 585, 601 N.Y.S.2d at
787. Section 330.30 provides that "[a]t any time after rendition of a verdict of
guilty and before sentence, the court may, upon motion of the defendant, set
aside or modify the verdict or any part thereof. . . ." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 330.30 (McKinney 1994).
119. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 589-90, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 790; N.Y. CIv.
RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2) (McKinney 1992).
120. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 585, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 787. The complainant,
Mr. Mohibi, was a native of Afghanistan. Among other names, defendant
repeatedly called Mr. Mohibi a "filthy Jew." Id.
121. Id. Mr. Mohibi suffered, among other injuries, a punctured lung, and
was in the hospital for an extended period of time. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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complainant, threatening to kill him if Mr. Mohibi called the
police. 124 Shortly after, defendant was arrested. 125
At trial, defendant was acquitted of charges of assault in the
first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth
degree, pertaining to the January 10th incident. 126 However,
defendant was found guilty of two counts of discrimination under
Civil Rights Law section 40-c(2), based upon the two incidents
that occurred on January 10 and February 6th. 127 Additionally,
defendant was also convicted of one count of aggravated
harassment in the second degree, based upon the January 10th
incident. 128
The court, in determining whether to set aside the verdict, first
had to determine whether or not the acts of the defendant
constituted a criminal violation of Civil Rights Law section 40-

c(2). 12 9 The court stated that, based on New York Penal Law
section 240.25,130 the defendant's striking and stabbing of the

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 585, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 786; N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2)
(McKinney 1992).
128. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 586, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
129. Id.; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2).
130. At the time of the trial, New York Penal Law § 240.25 stated:
A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm
another person:
1. He strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects him to physical
contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same; or
2.
In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes
an obscene gesture; or
3.
He follows a person in or about a public place or places; or ....
5. He engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts
which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve
no legitimate purpose.
Harassment is a violation.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25 (McKinney 1989); The Dieppa court noted
however, that Penal Law § 240.25 has since been significantly amended, and is
now substantively Penal Law § 240.26. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 586-87 n.1,
601 N.Y.S.2d at 788 n.1; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney 1994). New
York Penal Law § 240.26 states:
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complainant on January 10, and threatening to kill him on
February 6, "easily" fulfilled the elements of harassment as
defined by the Penal Law. 13 1 However, they noted that Civil
Rights Law section 40-c(2) requires not only harassment, but also
a showing that the "defendant's acts were committed because of
the complainant's race, creed, color, national origin, sex, marital
status or disability, as perceived by defendant." 132 Furthermore,
the defendant must have had "an intent to discriminate against
133
[the victim] in the exercise of his civil rights."
The court stated that defendant's act of calling the complainant
a "filthy Jew" and a "fucking Jew," even though the complainant
time and again protested that he was not Jewish, established that
defendant committed the acts because of what he believed to be
the complainant's religious and ethnic background to be. 134 The
court relied on the holding in People v. Grupe,135 where the
court held that intent can be inferred from a defendant's mere
136
perception of a complainant's religion, even if it is incorrect.
However, while this element was easily satisfied, the court had
a more difficult time determining whether or not there was
discrimination in the exercise of the employee's civil rights. In
deciding this controversial issue, the court discussed the history

A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent

to harass, annoy, or alarm another person:
1. He or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other
person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same;

or
2.
3.

He or she follows.a person in or about a public place or places; or
He or she engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits
acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which
serve no legitimate purpose.
Harassment in the second degree is a violation.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney 1994).
131. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 587, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
132. Id.

133. Id.
134. Id.

135. 141 Misc. 2d 6, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Crim. Ct. New York County
1988).
136. Id. at 9, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
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of Civil Rights Law section 40-c. 13 7 It noted that when Penal

Law section 240.25 was passed to "better implement" the policy
expressed in the New York Constitution, article I, section 11,

and later, in Civil Rights Law section 40-c, no exact definition
was given to the term "civil rights." 13 8 It therefore adopted the
meaning that was set forth by the New York Court of Appeals, in
People v. Kern, 139 that civil rights are "'those rights which

appertain to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community.'" 140 It also commented that the Civil Rights Clause
was not self-executing, 14 1 but only prohibits discrimination of
137. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 587, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 788; Civil Rights Law
§ 40-c was originally adopted as article I, section 11 of the New York State
Constitution. Memorandum from William T. Andrews to Hon. Herbert H.
Lehman (Apr. 18, 1941), in Bill Jacket to 1941 N.Y. Laws 910. Two years
later, the legislature amended the Penal Law, adding article 67
"Discrimination" Id. Article 67 was substantially similar to the language used
in article I, § 11 of the New York State Constitution. The amendment to the
Penal Law was introduced to enhance the policy of article I, of the New York
State Constitution by providing for "punitive provisions." Id. Assemblyman
William T. Andrews the amendment's sponsor, in a memorandum to then
governor Lehman, explained the purpose behind the amendment. Id. at 10-14.
In it he wrote "[tihat the term 'civil rights' has no fixed or absolute
definition." Id. at 13. The courts, employing the same interpretation
methodology, had defined "civil rights" as including some rights while
excluding others. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 587, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
Andrews concluded that, at the current time, it was not advisable "to have our
Legislature attempt a definition of the term." Bill Jacket to 1941 N.Y. Laws
910. In 1965, when the Penal Law of 1965 was enacted, repealing and
superseding the Penal Law of 1909, article 67 was omitted and now makes its
home in § 40-c & 40-d of the Civil Rights Law.
138. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 587-88, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 788-89.
139. 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990).
140. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 588, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (quoting Kern, 75
N.Y.2d at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (quoting 4 Rev.
Record of N.Y. State Const. Convention, 1938, at 2626 (statement of delegate
H. E. Lewis))).
141. See Chittenden v. Wurster, 152 N.Y. 345, 396, 46 N.E. 857, 874
(1897). ("[A] Constitutional provision is self-executing if it -supplies a
sufficient rule, by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and
protected or the duty imposed may be enforced.") (O'Brien, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
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rights provided by another statute. 142 Finally, the court observed
that, in the years since the passage of the Civil Rights Law, the
New York legislature "has given frequent consideration to
protecting the 'civil rights' of citizens." 14 3 It noted that such
statutes have been broadly construed so as to encompass as many

rights as possible.144 Thus, the court concluded in consideration
of such construction, that defendant's interference with the
complainant's right to work in the store, based upon defendant's

perception of the complainant's religion, even though incorrect,
was in fact proscribed behavior under Civil Rights Law section
14 5
40-c.
142. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 588, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 789; see also Kern, 75
N.Y.2d at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (stating that the
Civil Rights Law "prohibits discrimination only as to civil rights which are
'elsewhere declared'"); Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512,
531, 87 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1949) ("Obviously such rights are those elsewhere
declared."), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
143. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 588-89, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 789. The Court
provided as an example, Executive Law § 291. Section 291 provides in
relevant part:
1. The opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination
because of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex or marital
status is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
2. The opportunity to obtain education, the use of places of public
accommodation and the ownership, use and occupancy of housing
accommodations and commercial space without discrimination
because of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex or marital
status, as specified in section two hundred ninety-six of this article,
is hereby recognized and declared to be a civil right.
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 291 (1-2) (McKinney 1993).
144. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 589, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 789; see, e.g., People
v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 675, 682 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding
applicable under Civil Rights Law § 40-c a claim for "invidious gender
discrimination in employment"); Ganguly v. New York State Dep't of Mental
Hygiene-Dunlap Manhattan Psychiatric Ctr., 511 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). The court stated that the Civil Rights Law does not provide jurisdiction
over plaintiff's employment discrimination claim. However, the court noted
that it was not "imply[ing] that plaintiff's claims [were] insufficient to establish
causes of action under ...the Civil Rights Law." Id. at 429 n.4; Salonen v.
Barbella, 65 A.D.2d 753, 755, 409 N.Y.S.2d 759, 761 (2d Dep't 1978)
(applying Civil Rights Law § 40-c to voting).
145. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 589, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
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Furthermore, the court determined that the statute's language

was clear and unambiguous, and therefore, its meaning must be
"given full effect." 14 6 The Dieppa court found that Civil Rights
Law section 40-c "on its face" clearly states that "all persons are
protected from harassment or discrimination in the exercise of
their civil rights." 147 Therefore, defendant's repeated threats and
physical abuse of the complainant, because of his perceived race
or creed, provide a "factual basis" for the jury's determination
that defendant interfered with and affected the complainant's
148
exercise of his civil rights.
Had defendant's case been brought in Federal court, however,
the result would not have been the same. While both Civil Rights
Law section 40-c, 149 and its Federal counterpart, 18 U.S.C.

§ 242,150 protect a person's civil rights subject to criminal
prosecution, there are significant differences between the two.
First, 18 U.S.C § 242 applies only to those persons acting
"under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom."

151

However, Civil Rights Law section 40-c does not

require state participation. 152 Here, the defendant was not acting

146. Id. (citation omitted).
147. Id.; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAV § 40-c(2) (McKinney 1992).
148. Dieppa, 158 Misc. 2d at 589, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90.
149. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (West 1969). This statute provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of this color, or race, than are
prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death
results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
Id.
151. Id.
152. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2). Section 40-c(2) simply prohibits
discrimination based on "race, creed, color, national origin, sex, marital
status, or disability." Id.
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under color of law. 153 Rather, he was acting in his personal

capacity when he performed the acts against the complainant. 154
The Federal statute would therefore be inapplicable to the
defendant in this case.
Next, the Federal statute protects persons from the deprivation
of a right, privilege or immunity protected by the Constitution or
by federal law. 155 Harassment is not specifically set forth, as it is
in New York's counterpart, section 40-c(2) of the Civil Rights
Law. 156 Therefore, unless the form of harassment inflicted upon
the employee deprived him of one of these rights or privileges, it
would not be covered by the Federal statute.

The federal statute, unlike the New York statute, covers acts
committed under color of state law that deprive persons of a
right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution, or
acts committed because of a.victim's color, race, or national
origin.157 Here, defendant acted against the complainant because
of complainant's perceived religious affiliation. Although religion
is a right protected by the Constitution, 158 the defendant was not
153. But see United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). The Court held
that "[pirivate persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited
action, are acting 'under color' of law for purposes of the statute. To act
'under color' of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the
State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State
or its agent." Id. at 794. Further, the court held that private persons who
participated in the murder of three men with local law enforcement officials,
acted under color of state law even thought they were not law enforcement
officials themselves. Id. at 794-95. Therefore, under Price, if defendant had
acted with someone else who was acting under color of state law, defendant
could then be prosecuted under § 242.
154. There is nothing to indicate that the defendant was in any way acting
on behalf of the state. Instead, the facts indicate that defendant was merely "a
freq4ent customer of the fast food store" where Mr. Mohibi worked. Id. at
585, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 242.
156. The statute mentions "rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States," but not specifically
harassment. Id.
157. Id.
158. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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acting under color of state law. Thus, the federal statute would be
inapplicable to the case at bar. Therefore, while defendant's
conviction in state court was upheld, the same result would not
have occurred had defendant been prosecuted in federal court.
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